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4.
Consequently the practice has grow up of informers deal ing direct with subordinate members of the Police and Revenue Departments, both European and Chinese, to whom they give information and through whom rewards on various fixed scales are paid. Such a system lends itself to very serious abuse as it is in the nature of things impossible to prevent the sharing of the rewards between the informers and the subordinate officers with whom they deal, or to provide any efficient check on the transactions It is as a rule impossible to ask an informer to sign a receipt and there is therefore a risk that a dishonest officer may retain part of the reward. Informers also are inclined to attach themselves to particular officers who on occasion find it necessary to advance money on account, recouping themselves out of the rewards when available, and when for any reason, no rewards are forthcoming they look for other opportunities to make up deficits and no doubt to cover future risks. Thus the line where dishonesty begins becomes very indeterminate and there arises a tendency among subordinate officers to look for illegitimate additions to their pay, with a resultant lowering of the standards of public duty in the service generally.
5.
In the Chinese Maritime Customs Service
rewards are paid on a fixed scale to the officer who is
responsible for the seizure of illicit goods, but that Service is concerned merely with cargo passing through, and not with a general search of persons and buildings such as is required in this Colony. This system appears objectionable in that it acknowledges a right to special
rewards for the performance of work for which officers are
already adequately paid, incidentally creating dis- satisfaction among the officers of other Departments to whom similar opportunities are not open. There is also the risk of its tending to cause neglect of duties which
are equally important though not privately remunerative.
Mi1996 Ce 140 00
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